Since the 1980s major policy changes in public sector reforms have occurred throughout the OECD countries -with a considerable cross-country variance in the timing, scope and focus of such reforms. In dealing with this development in a comparative perspective, the article will proceed in three steps.
First, nutshell profiles of the development and current state of public sector reform in a number of key OECD countries will be sketched in order to identify the degree of institutional variance among them. Then, after submitting a hypothetical explanatory scheme and in analytically singling out some crucial dimensions of public sector reform policies, the attempt will be made to 'explain' these dimensions of variance.
Finally, the question will be taken up as to whether the countries´ trajectories show convergence or divergence.
Variance of public sector reforms

Distinction between 'traditional' and NPM-guided reforms
At the outset, a distinction should be made between 'traditional' reforms and reforms explicitly inspired and guided by 'New Public Management' (NPM).
Traditional reforms originated in earlier reform periods, particularly during the 1960s and 1970s. Reflecting the zeitgeist of that period, they were conceptually geared to the • The (professional, academic etc.) discourses and discourse communities, including the international discourse, which may influence decisionmaking.
In the following some crucial dimensions of the decision-making and implementation of public sector reforms will be singled out and 'causal interpretations' will be tried out.
The 'take off' decision on public sector reforms
The take-off decision to embark upon (large-scale) public sector reforms has in most cases been triggered by an economic and budgetary crisis which led or even compelled the political decision-makers, regardless of political party complexion, to seek remedy in (far-ranging) public sector reforms, largely of the NPM persuasion. In most cases the adoption of public sector reforms went hand in hand with a broader neo-liberal re-orientation of the welfare state and economic policies.
The most conspicuous example of the overpowering influence of the budgetary situation on the government´s decision to turn to neo-liberal economic policies and, at the same time, to NPM-guided public sector reforms can be inspected in New Zealand. It was the Labour Party that, having won the election of 1984 over the conservative National Party largely on a pro-'old' welfare state campaign, shifted, in view of a desperate budgetary situation, (literally over night) to neo-liberal economic policies, including stringent public sector reforms.
Another revealing example can be seen in the French socialists in the early 1980s.
They had hardly decided, in 1981, to start a massive programme of nationalising key industries (in the pursuit of 'old' socialist ideas), when they, not later than 1983, under the impression of the international economic environment, performed a dramatic policy change and began a neo-liberal re-orientation (see Schmidt 2000: 294) . In the late 1980s the Socialist Prime Minister Rocard introduced the first NPMguided public sector reform program (see Postif 1996: 215) .
In Sweden, it was under the impression of an economic and budgetary crisis that the Social Democrats, returning to power in 1982, embarked upon significant neo-liberal modifications of the famed Swedish Welfare State and upon administrative reforms.
German makes for another striking case. After the country had stayed conspicuously aloof from the NPM-guided public sector reforms, it was the ever worsening budgetary situation, in the wake of the mounting costs of Unification, that finally broke the ground for the adoption of NPM-oriented public sector reforms.
The USA are a kind of deviant case in that on the federal government level managerialist reforms have been propagated, while (and although) the country found itself in a relatively comfortable economic and budgetary situation. In this case the development may be explained by the typical personal involvement of recent presidents in federal government reforms (as an 'actor-centred' factor) as well as by the country´s managerialist tradition (as a 'cultural tradition' factor).
Conceptual scope and instrument mix of public sector reforms
The conceptual scope and mix of public sector reforms is significantly determined by the country-specific starting conditions and the modernisation needs (or 'leads') which follow from them (for a conceptual emphasis on country-specific starting conditions see Wright 1994) In the U.K. the public sector was characterised, in the late 1970s, by a wide scope of state-owned (nationalised) companies, by a high degree of governmental and administrative centralisation (at the Whitehall level in the traditional absence of an administrative meso level) and by a quasi-monopoly of the public sector in the delivery of health and social services. On this background it was plausible, if not compelling that the new Public Management concepts called for the devolution of central government functions to the newly created ('Next Steps') agencies as well as for the market-testing and 'outsourcing' of services hitherto entirely delivered by public sector personnel proper. The same applies to New Zealand (whose extreme degree of administrative centrality is mirrored in almost 90 percent of public sector personnel being employed by central government).
Sweden's starting conditions, towards the end of the 1970s, were characterised by a high degree of decentralisation -with the time-honoured largely autonomously operating central agencies carrying out most of the administrative State functions and with the local authorities traditionally playing a politically as well as functionally strong role. The health and social services have traditionally been delivered almost entirely by county respectively municipal personnel. Vis-à-vis these starting conditions reform measures have been pursued, since the 1980s, on two tracks. On the other hand, linking up with and stepping up the country´s decentralisation tradition, further public functions were devolved to the local authorities and their autonomy was enlarged (through the Local Government Act of 1991). On the other hand, in reaction to the quasi-monopoly of public delivery, NPM-derived concepts have been introduced (purchaser-provider split in health delivery on the county level and market-testing, vouchers etc in the municipalities (see Montin 2000) .
France was, in the late 1970s, marked by her traditional unitary and ('Napoleonic') centralist government structure as well as by a legalist hierarchical administrative model. In view of these starting conditions particularly two tracks of reforms ensued.
Since the 1980s legislation and measures to decentralise and deconcentrate political and administrative functions have been effected in order to overcome the country´s high degree of centralisation. Since the late 1980s NPM-guided managerialist reforms have been pushed by socialist as well as conservative governments for remedying the inflexibility the traditional administrative structures.
In Germany, too, the starting conditions significantly account for the course and focus of administrative modernisation. In the German federal system federal legislation and policies are almost entirely implemented by the Länder (and, within the Länder, by the local authorities). In this one might detect a form of (in NPM jargon) 'agencification'. Primary health care has since long been provided by private medical doctors with the would-be patient having free choice among them (by means of a kind of insurance-based voucher system). Hospitals have been operated by a plurality of institutions (churches, red cross, municipalities etc.). Furthermore, the majority of the social services (kindergartens, homes for the elderly etc.) have, under the so called subsidiarity principle, been provided by non-public, not-for-profit welfare ('charitable') organisations, historically affiliated with the churches and the labour movement. Thus, in the field of social services, the local authorities have traditionally focused on an, in current NPM parlance, 'enabling' function. Vis-à-vis these starting conditions it should not be surprising that little attention was in Germany given to key NPM concepts such as agencification and outsourcing of health and social services.
When NPM finally made its entry unto the German modernisation debate, the interest was on managerialist concepts (in the so called New Steering Model) that seemed apt to instil more flexibility and cost-efficiency in the country´s traditionally legalist and hierarchical administrative world (see Wollmann 2000b Wollmann , 2003b .
Style of decision-making on public sector reforms
The style of decision-making on public sector reforms in a country (e.g., 'top down' or 'bottom up', 'wholesale' or fragmented) significantly hinges on the institutional setting of the country (unitary or federal, majoritarian single party ('Westminster') government or multi-party coalition government etc.).
The U.K. epitomises the type of unitary state 'Westminster' decision-making in which policy changes on public sector reforms for the entire country can be decided by simple majority vote in Parliament and can be enforced 'top down'. Similarly this applies to New Zealand.
By contrast, in federal countries the federal competence on public sector matters pertains, in principle, only to the federal level, while the other levels of government have to right to handle administrative reform matters on their own. Hence, for instance, in the US and in Germany the States respectively the Länder as well as the local government levels show a modernisation profile of their own. In fact, in Germany the local government level was first, in the early 1990s, to set off a new wave of administrative reform.
In Sweden which is a unitary, but highly decentralised state, a mixed picture can be found. While, on the one hand, central government has, mostly through national legislation, regulated important questions of public sector reform, the local authorities, on the other hand, thanks to their traditional autonomy, have been selfstanding actors in administrative reform matters.
2.4. Political range and premises of public sector reforms.
In the decision-making on the policy change and policy formulation in public sector reforms the political parties, first of all the government party play, of course, a crucial 
Conceptual and theoretical profile of public sector reforms
The conceptual focus and theoretical underpinning of public sector reform can be significantly influenced by the discourse and the discourse communities and coalitions that have been involved in formulating, promoting and legitimating public sector reform concepts. by which such decision-making may be conceptually prepared, guided, accompanied, supported and/or legitimated (on discourse see For rendering the concept of discourse applicable to public sector reform policy a number of distinctions seem useful.
First, a distinction can be made between the political discourse and debate, on the one hand, and the professional as well as academic discourse on public sector reforms, on the other. Allowance made to overlapping, the former typically encompasses the political debate conducted within and by the political parties and political elites, but also in the media, while the professional/academic discourse can be identified with groups and individuals outside the political arena proper.
Second, within the professional/academic discourse arena, in turn, different (sub) communities and sub-groups can be distinguished which, being premised on different normative and conceptual assumptions and guided by different disciplinary, professional, but also financial interests, may struggle among each other for gaining and retaining the dominance ('dominant opinion') in the discourse.
Third, with regard to their possible access to and linkage with the political decisionmaking on public sector reforms, the discourse communities may be distinguished according to their location in that policy-close, administration-centred and "at large' discourse communities may be discerned. While the policy-close variant may be characterised as being convened and dominated by political actors, in the administration-centred one administrative actors prevail. By contrast, the at large' variant embraces, on a voluntary, self-organised basis, academics, professionals, but interest representatives and consultants.
Fourth, last not least is the international discourse arena and its relations with the national discourse arena and communities . The national discourse arena may be influenced by the dominant international discourse and international organisations supporting it. Hence, the national discourse may be shaped by international and transnational policy learning (see Rose 1993 , Dolowitz/ March 1996 and imitation (mimetic isomorphism, DiMaggio/Powell 1991). In fact, since the 1980s, the international discourse on public sector reform has been increasingly dominated by New Public Management and its wider neo-liberal policy implications. On the top of it, NPM has been adopted and propagated by influential international organisations, such as OECD, as the preferred, if not only path to public sector modernisation (see critically Naschold 1995 : 69, Sahlin-Andersson 2001 . The momentum of this international discourse and its implicit 'Anglosaxon-centricity' has been complemented by the hegemony of English as the lingua franca.
Turning to the analysis, cases of policy-close discourse communities can be found in the Anglo-Saxon countries. In the U.K., following 1979, Margret Thatcher made it a point to keep the Whitehall top civil servants ('mardarins') (whom she suspected of impeding reforms) as well as university-based academics (whom she also mistrusted) out of the reform debate. Instead, she turned for advice to business leaders, such as Derek Rayner (whom she appointed to chair a commission mandated to 'scrutinise' central government administration) as well as to New Right think tanks (see Pollitt/Bouckaert 2000: 272 ff.) . Similarly in New Zealand, the Finance Minister convened a policy-centred discourse coalition, consisting of top officials from the Treasury and of some handpicked neo-liberal university economists and constituting an almost 'secretive elite' (Halligan 2001: 85) . As a result, New Zealand´s NPM policy received a more pronouncedly theoretical imprint and wording (rational choice, principal/agent theory etc.) than in any other country.
In the USA where recent presidents tended to resume personal leadership in federal level administrative reform matters, President Reagan, in pursuit of this goal to "downsize (federal) government", typically appointed a prominent businessman to chair a commission ('Grace Commission') mandated to have the federal government operations checked, surveyed and reported on by private sector economists (see During the 1990s, the application of NPM-derived concepts (performance management, purchase/provider split, market-testing etc.) has progressed which, besides the neo-liberal re-orientation of the social democrats, can be attributed to the close ties which Sweden´s pertinent discourse communities, not least thanks to the in Sweden widespread knowledge of English, entertained with the international (primarily Anglophone) debate, particularly with practitioners and academics in Great Britain regarding NPM concepts and practice.
Germany's story is about a conspicuous shift in the modernisation discourse (see
Wollmann 2000b). Well unto the late 1980s, that discourse was dominated by
traditional modernizers who, consisting of administrative practitioners, administrative lawyers and (marginally) social scientists, favoured continuous reformist adaptation within the accepted model of public administration. On the local level a crucial role was played by KGSt, a municipally funded independent non-profit agency which, in advising the local authorities in organisational matters since 1949, had over the years advocated the traditional ('Max Weberian') model of legal rule-bound hierarchical public administration. In doing so, KGSt lent legitimacy to the traditional administrative model which contributed to shielding the German debate from the international NPM discourse. In the early 1990s this discourse constellation changed dramatically. First, KGSt made a radical strategy shift. In all of a sudden severely criticising the traditional administrative model of (local) administration, KGSt put forward a "New Steering Model' which heavily drew on New Public Management concepts, particularly on a variant that had been put in place in the Dutch city of Tilburg. Based on the prestige and credibility which KGSt had adquired, over the years, in the modernisation discourse, its strategy shift has been crucial in opening the German discourse arena to the international NPM debate. Another single event that was decisive in shattering and de-legitimating the traditional administrative model was an international competition which, in 1993, was organised and funded by Bertelsmann Foundation. Aim of this world-wide competition was to identify the most innovative cities in the field of administrative modernisation. When, as result of the competition, the New Zealand city of Christchurch and the US city of Phoenix, Arizona, came out on top, while the German candidate cities ended at the very bottom, this was taken by many practitioners and academics as a devastating verdict on the viability of the traditional type of (local) administration. This development has been accompanied and mirrored by a conspicuous shift in the composition of the relevant discourse community. While, in the past, the (afore-mentioned) traditional reformers stood in the fore, now the centre stage in the discourse was taken over by economists, chief executives, NPM-sympathising academics and, last not least, professionals from international consultancy firms that discovered and entered the German consultancy market. (It should be noticed that this shift on discourse arena coincided with the mounting budgetary crisis which, as was argued earlier, was crucial in triggering public sector reforms).
Receptivity for NPM ideas
Finally the supposition shall be taken up that a country's receptivity (or nonreceptivity) to NPM ideas and concepts is influenced by its specific institutional and cultural traditions.
In the USA the recent reform message that the public sector should learn from private business and its managerialism found easy acceptance for reasons that are deeply ingrained in the country´s history and culture. By contrast, Germany is marked by a State and law tradition which historically was shaped by the Roman Law tradition (with its recognition of the State as a selfstanding legal personality and its distinction of public and private law) and by the evolution of the Rechtsstaat tradition (with its axiom to direct and control public administration by a codified set of legislative provisions and to put it under judicial review. By the same token, the ('Max Weberian') model of an (externally legal rulebound and internally hierarchically controlled) public administration has become and remained part and parcel of Germany´s public administration tradition. It should be added that, reflecting the country's traumatic experience with tyrannical and lawnegating government in the recent past, the Rechtsstaat has, institutionally, legally and normatively, been entrenched even more firmly in the post-war Federal Republic.
Another important component in the country´s political and institutional tradition can be seen in the existence of politically and functionally strong local government based on a multi-function model. In sum, these institutional and cultural traditions have constituted barriers to an easy entry and acceptance of NPM concepts that are expressly 'imported' from the private sector and its different operational logic.
Sweden comes as an intriguingly mixed case. On the one hand, the country, too, stands in a Roman Law and Rechtsstaat tradition which stems from its earlier historical links with the Continental European, not least German, development.
Furthermore the country possesses a long tradition of highly decentralised government -with politically as well as functionally strong local governments. On the other hand, Sweden has traditionally shown great pragmatism in reforming her institutions not least by learning from international experience. Particularly since the second world war Sweden has knit close cultural and English language ties with the Anglo-Saxon world which eased the way to get to know, to adopt and to "try out'
NPM-concepts, especially of British provenance.
.
(Progressing) convergence or (continuing) divergence of the countries' trajectories ?
In the conclusion the question shall be taken up as to whether and to which degree the country trajectories of public sector reforms, in the countries under consideration in this paper, have shown convergence or divergence. The countries' reform trajectories exhibit a great variance in the timing, the scope and instruments of public sector reforms encompassing and mixing 'traditional' as well as NPM-guided reform strategies and elements. The variability and multi-faceted mix of the reform concepts and measures could be brought out even more clearly, if space allowed .
Put in a broad-brush manner, the trajectories of public sector, on the one hand, reveal a significant degree of cross-country convergence on which just a few points should be highlighted.
• Public sector reforms which have been initiated in all countries since the late 1970s (with a significant variance in time and scope) have been embedded in and driven by a more general policy change which marked the departure from the "old' welfare state and its underlying Keynesian policy and the advent of a neo-
.liberal re-orientation in welfare state and economic policies. In this sense, the recent wave of public sector reform that can, on a larger or smaller scale, be observed in all countries can be interpreted as just one dimensions of a more general and fundamental policy change.
• In concrete terms, there has been a move across countries to the devolution of political and administrative functions in the intergovernmental setting. This applies particularly to countries whose starting conditions were characterised by the traditional profile of a unitary highly centralised state. So, in the early 1980s
France made a decisive step towards 'classical' decentralisation. In the late 1980s
Great Britain followed suit with the NPM-guided ('next steps') creation of central agencies. Sweden, by tradition, was already a highly decentralised country (with politically and functionally strong local government levels, continued, during the 1980s, to further devolve state functions to the local authorities.
• Another general drive across countries was directed at dissolving the 'monopoly' of the public sector in the delivery of health and social services. This applies particularly to Great Britain and Sweden where, as a result of the build-up of the post-war modern welfare state, the health and social services had come to be almost entirely delivered by public sector personnel. The reform concepts and instruments that have been put in place range from market-testing, voucher systems to outsoucing and (material) privatisation.
• In all countries, on different scales of conceptual and instrumental stringency, managerialist principles, including performance management and procedures to evaluate performance outputs and results have been introduced. This applies not least to Germany and France whose starting conditions were characterised by the traditional existence of legal rules-bound hierarchical ('Max Weberian') bureaucracy.
While, thus, the institutional trajectories show conspicuous cross-country convergence, there can be no doubt that they, at least up to now, continue to exhibit significant divergence in important aspects. In summarising these aspects and features of divergence and in drawing on an ideal- The further course of the development is up for speculation, at best, for 'informed guessing'.
Those who hold that there will be further convergence argue that internationally powerful forces and agents (such as the globalisation of the financial and economic markets) are bound to exert a degree of external determinism which is going to impose permanent, if not increasing pressure, embodied and exercised by international organisations, such as OECD, on the national economies and states to adapt and converge (see Thoenig 2003) . This argument may find a strong case in the European Union which has been pushing not only for formulating and enforcing (primarily economic) policies and related legal regulations (such as on market liberalisation) in "one space without internal frontiers', but has also, through the growing flux of EU regulations which need to be implemented by and within the members states, promoting 'one European administrative space', without having an explicit mandate and competence to interfere with the internal institutional matters of the member states.
In spite of these external -international as well as, in the case of the EU, intermember state -pressures there is good reason to assume that the institutional variance and divergence is going to persist, at least in the foreseeable future. Notwithstanding the conspicuous policy and strategy change in public sector reforms which took place throughout the countries at different points in time and on a different scale, the impact and persistence of country-specific features has been conspicuous which was demonstrated particularly by the salience of country-specific starting conditions and the country-specific institutional and cultural traditions, if not 'path-dependencies'.
There are no factors or developments in sight which could plausibly change these givens. It can finally be plausibly argued that, in view of the onrush of external factors prompting an international convergences and harmonisation of policies, the decisions on the (internal) institutions and the polity of a country will continue to be claimed (and jealously defended) by the national states and their governments (on all levels) as remaining reserve and prerogative of intra-national, that is domestic policy and decision-making (for a similar argument see König/Fuechner 2000).
